JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND EQUAL PROTECTION IN A
DEMOCRACY OF RIGHTS
Stephen M. Griffin*
Even before the controversy stirred by Bush v. Gore,1 a number of
scholars had initiated a debate concerning the long-term viability of
judicial supremacy.2 Post-Bush, these arguments may well receive a
more respectful hearing. Before the debate can be productive, however, its structure will require a substantial overhaul. It has been apparent for some time that the traditional argument over whether judicial review is countermajoritarian is played out.3 Indeed, the most
sophisticated works of recent scholarship avoid this old dispute entirely. They ask a different question: what kind ofjudicial
supremacy
4
can be justified in a democracy that respects rights?
I suggest this new challenge to judicial supremacy applies particularly well to the area of equal protection. Indeed, I believe that we no
longer need any form of heightened scrutiny in equal protection jurisprudence. In this Article, I will support this intuition by arguing
that we should not rely on the Supreme Court to protect the rights
against discrimination traditionally afforded by the Equal Protection
Clause.
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I imagine some readers will ask immediately why Americans, particularly those who have historically benefited from heightened scrutiny, should be interested in giving up something so valuable. I am
afraid my answer is blunt: if you are a member of a racial minority,
the Supreme Court is not your friend! The past twenty years of decisions by the Court have made this abundantly clear. Furthermore,
the protection against unjust discrimination all Americans receive
from civil rights statutes is plainly superior to the protection provided
by the Equal Protection Clause. But the development that has sealed
the case against heightened scrutiny is the Court's relatively new interest in destroying civil rights created through democratic deliberation.
These developments are not merely passing phenomena. They
are rooted in the current institutional structure of the American state
and are thus part of the American constitutional order.6 However, I
also wish to show that the move away from heightened scrutiny
should not be viewed as merely politically strategic, but normatively
desirable. My way of summarizing this normative desirability is to say
that we presently live in a "democracy of rights." The concept of a
democracy of rights connects rights with democratic deliberation. In
such a democracy, government actors take it for granted that it is desirable to create, enforce, and promote individual constitutional and
legal rights. Hence, the political branches of government (not just
the courts) are seeking constantly to maintain and extend the system
of rights they have created through democratic means.
Our democracy of rights and the current hostility of the Court toward certain forms of civil rights are products of two important historical discontinuities in American constitutionalism. The United
States has not always been a democracy of rights. For most of its history, with the singular exception of Reconstruction, there was no perceived need for a national guarantee of civil rights. 7 Thus, the first
discontinuity was the civil rights movement and my argument emphasizes the importance of this movement in transforming American
government into a democracy of rights. But while the civil rights
movement democratized rights by making them an important part of
the agenda of the political branches, it also had the effect of politicizing the issue of rights. This is the second discontinuity. This politicization eventually reached the Supreme Court itself and ensured that
the Court could not be counted on as a steady defender of civil
rights.

See, e.g., GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT:
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Court has been to legal claims brought by minorities).
6 For a discussion of the relationship between the Constitution and the American state, see
STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORYTO POLITICS 68-87 (1996).
' See discussion infra Part I.B.
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I want to make two observations about the kind of argument I will
be offering. First, my argument is historicist.8 This means that while I
Will be making a sort of democratic critique of judicial supremacy
(limited to the area of equal protection law), it is not a critique that
could have been offered just a few decades ago. The advent of the
civil rights movement and our present democracy of rights should be
viewed as transforming the ground of the debate over judicial supremacy. Therefore, I do not purport to advance a general critique
ofjudicial supremacy, applicable to any moment in American history.
Second, my argument is comparative. As I proceed, some will think
of particular equal protection issues where it appears the Court is still
making an important contribution to defending the civil rights of reviled groups. Some will also find reason to think that the political
branches have not been as protective of civil rights as they should be.
What I will be urging, however, is that we not simultaneously use an
idealized conception of how the Supreme Court operates while also
employing a realistic understanding of how the political branches
operate. This kind of comparison is cleary unfair to the political
branches and is a non-sequitur in any case. Any realistic appreciation of how the branches of government interact on issues of rights
must take into consideration the effect of the politicization of rights
on all the branches, including the judiciary.
In Part One, I first describe the contemporary politics of rights in
a way that makes clear how present circumstances make it possible to
advance a critique of judicial supremacy that is at once democratic
and rights-protecting. I then demonstrate how the two historical discontinuities described above came about and why they necessitate a
historicist and comparative approach to evaluating judicial supremacy. Finally, I show how the idea of a democracy of rights links the
concepts of rights and deliberation in terms of democratic theory.
Part Two shows why heightened scrutiny is no longer needed in
equal protection jurisprudence. Specifically, I will argue that the political branches have a distinct deliberative advantage over the judiciary in ensuring that racial minorities are protected against discrimination. Indeed, recent Supreme Court decisions have had the effect
of destroying valuable constitutional rights for minority groups. I
discuss three examples in some detail: affirmative action, racial redistricting, and Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.

For an argument that constitutional theory should proceed from a historicist perspective,
see Stephen M. Griffin, ConstitutionalTheory Transformed, 108 YALE LJ. 2115 (1999) (showing
how all three branches of government have contributed to constitutional development).
9 See GRIFFiN, supranote 6, at 123 ("To fairlyjustifyjudicial review in a prudential sense, we
must compare the nonideal legislative process to the nonidealjudicial process.").
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I. A DEMOCRACY OF RIGHTS
A. How the PoliticalBranches Protect Rights
In contemporary American democracy, the politics of rights is
governed by the reality that all government actors are in the business
of protecting constitutional and legal rights. As I will show below, the
popularity of rights as a political issue is perhaps the most important
legacy of the civil rights movement and justifies describing our form
of government as a democracy of rights. That legacy includes laws
providing a national guarantee of civil rights along with agencies to
enforce them. Further, the rights recognized in the laws passed since
the advent of the movement are not limited to those already recognized in the Constitution. The Americans with Disabilities Act 0
(ADA) is perhaps the most prominent example, a law that sweeps
broadly to create completely new legal rights that had no prior
precedent in American law.
At the same time, no one doubts that the Supreme Court continues to stand ready to protect constitutional rights in a wide variety of
contexts. In the course of his recent argument for 'judicial minimalism," Cass Sunstein provides a useful list of ten generally accepted
core principles that constitute the foundation of contemporary constitutional law." Sunstein's principles include protection against unauthorized imprisonment, protection of political dissent, the right to
vote, religious liberty, and protection against racial or sexual subordination. Sunstein is certainly correct that the Court stands ready in
some sense to vindicate all of these rights. What he does not point
out is that the political branches stand ready as well, and have taken
numerous concrete actions to that end.
Congress has a long and impressive record, now extending over
nearly forty years, in protecting constitutional and legal rights. This
record includes such famous laws as the Equal Pay Act of 1963,3 the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,14 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ' (renewed on three separate occasions in 1970, 1975, and 1982).16 It also
includes less famous but still important laws such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972,' the Rehabilitation Act of 1973," and the Vot'0 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
" See SUNSTEIN, supranote 2, at 64-67.

12See id.
Pub. L.
Pub. L.
5 Pub. L.
,6 For an
4

No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56.
No. 88-352,78 Stat. 241.
No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
account of these renewals, see STEVEN F. LAWSON, IN PURSUIT OF POWER:

SOUTHERN BLACKS AND ELEOORAL POLITICS, 1965-1982 (1985).
17

Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602.

" Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX, 86 Stat. 235.

Jan. 2002]

JUDICIAL SUPREMACYAND EQUAL PROTECTION

ing Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1984.2'
When the Civil Rights Act of 196821 failed to reduce housing discrimination, Congress revisited the issue and passed a much stronger
measure, the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988.22 When Congress saw that the Court's decision in Widmar v. Vincen2 5 was not being enforced, it approved the Equal Access Act,24 which made it unlawful for school administrators to deny access to facilities to students
who wanted to participate in extracurricular religious activities. Congress also took a limited step to redress a severe violation of civil
rights by compensating citizens of Japanese ancestry for their internment in concentration camps during World War II through the Civil
Liberties Act of 1988.2
These examples show that Congress has acted to protect a number of different constitutional rights. In this Article, I will focus my
attention on the right to vote and the rights against discriminatory
treatment guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Once attention is directed at rights against discrimination, it is even more apparent that Congress has created important new26 legal rights. Here, one of the most persuasive examples
is the ADA.

In enacting the ADA, Congress found that forty-three million
Americans have physical or mental disabilities 27 and that discrimination against the disabled persists in "employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public
services."28 In one of its findings, Congress tracked the famous language of the CaroleneProductsfootnote,' saying that "individuals with
disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have
been.. . subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and
relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society ... resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of
the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and con-

"Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355.
Pub. L. No. 98-435,98 Stat. 1678.
" Pub. L. No. 90-284, tits. VIII-IX, 82 Stat. 73, 81-90.
Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619.
454 U.S. 263 (1981).
" Pub. L. No. 98-377, tit. VIII, 98 Stat. 1267,1302 (1984).
5Pub.
L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903.
"6 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
See42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (1) (2001).
Id at§ 12101(a) (3).
See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (discussing a stricter
scrutiny where prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may seriously curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily relied upon to protect minorities).
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tribute to, society." ° The ADA prohibited discrimination against the
disabled by private employers and state and local governments."
For my purposes, the key point to grasp about the ADA is that it is
targeted at a form of discrimination for which there is no parallel
federal constitutional right. The Supreme Court has never recognized the disabled as a "suspect class" under the Equal Protection
Clause and thus there is no constitutional problem with state and local governments discriminating against them. Furthermore, the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the ADA are similar in that they prohibit discrimination in private employment, an area unreachable by the terms
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Clearly, there are forms of discrimination for which the statutory civil rights provided by Congress are
superior to those provided by the Supreme Court.
Anyone taking stock of the contemporary environment in which
judicial review is exercised must therefore take notice of the phenomenon of Congress at times having greater solicitude for individual rights than the supposedly rights-conscious judiciary. In 1994
alone, Congress enacted the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances
Act,32 the Violence Against Women Act, 33 the Drivers' Privacy Protection Act,3 4 and certain rights-protective 3 provisions of the Violent
?
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act.

Showing that the political branches have protected rights does not
advance my argument against heightened scrutiny very far. It simply
demonstrates that Congress has joined with the judiciary, at least on
occasion, as a partner in the creation of important individual rights.
The story becomes more complex, however, once it is understood
that Congress has also been a reliable defender of civil rights in response to decisions by the Supreme Court that have restricted the
scope of rights against discrimination. In passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,36 for example, Congress dealt with a form of
employment discrimination that the Court had failed to address." It
restored the effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act by amending it in
1982" to negate the Court's decision in City of Mobile v. Bolden.s9
When the Court narrowed the scope of several anti-discrimination

'0
"

42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (7).
See42 U.S.C. § 12112.

Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat. 694 (1994).
" Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994).
Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. XXX, 108 Stat. 2099 (1994). The Act was held constitutional in
Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
m Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. XXI, 108 Stat. 2071 (1994) (conferring authority on the Attorney
General to file a civil suit seeking equitable and declaratory relief against deprivations of rights
by law enforcement officers).
Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076.
See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131.
446 U.S. 55 (1980).
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laws in Grove City College v. Bell,40 Congress responded with the Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 1987. 4'
The Civil Rights Act of 199142 is the most consequential recent example of this congressional maintenance of civil rights. Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 4a Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 4 and Martin v.
Wiks' were prominent 1989 statutory decisions interpreting Tide VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in which the Court seriously damaged
the rights of litigants who were the victims of employment discrimination. Congress responded relatively quickly with the Civil Rights Act,
which reversed the harmful effects of all of these decisions.
Most remarkably, Congress attempted to reverse Employment Division v. Smith46 with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) .41
While RFRA did not implicate directly the kind of equal protection
and discrimination issues with which I am concerned, the Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,48 which ruled RFRA unconstitutional,
most assuredly did have important implications for Congress' power
to protect citizens against discrimination.
City of Boerne astonished many scholars in that the Supreme Court
chose to preserve its exclusive right to interpret the Constitution over
an effort to protect an important individual right, the free exercise of
religion. 9 In doing so, the Court invented a doctrine restricting
Congress' power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment that appears to be having a radioactive influence on the
Equal Protection Clause. 50
In Kimel v. FloridaBoard of Regents,5' the Court used City of Boerne to
immunize state governments against suits based on the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.52 The majority in Kimel reasoned
that since the Court had never regarded classifications based on age
as appropriate for strict scrutiny, Congress had no reason to do
roughly the equivalent via statute.3 The majority did not address the

o 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28.
42 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
4

490 U.S. 642 (1989).

" 490 U.S. 228 (1989).

490 U.S. 755 (1989).
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
4 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993).
521 U.S. 507 (1997). The story is not over yet. Congress responded to City of Boerne by
enacting the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), Pub. L. No. 106274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000). President Clinton signed RLUIPA into law on September 22, 2000.
0 See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, EqualProtectionby Law: FederalAntidiscriminationLegislationAfterMorrison and Kimel, 110 YALE LJ. 441,454 (2000).
" See id.
s' 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that employee could not sue the state for money damages
under the ADEA, because the statute invalidly abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from private action).
12 Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat.
602 (1967).
" Kimen4 528 U.S. at 78-91 (2000).
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question of why Congress could not, on its own, determine that age
discrimination by state governments was a significant violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. City of Boerne was also cited in United States v.
Morrison,54 which struck down the civil remedy for gender-motivated
55
violence provided in the Violence Against Women Act.

In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,56 the Supreme Court extended the rationale of City of Boerne and Kimel by
holding that states cannot be sued for money damages under Title I
of the ADA. The Court noted that the disabled had never been held
to be a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis and so
states could not be required "to make special accommodations for
the disabled, so long as their actions towards such individuals are rational."5 7 Congress could nonetheless subject the states to private actions if it could meet City of Boernds requirements of congruence and
proportionality.58 Unfortunately, despite the massive record assembled by Congress, the Court found no sufficient evidence that the
states themselves were systematically discriminating against the disabled.
I will consider these cases in greater detail in Part II.C. For the
moment, I hope two points are clear. First, regardless what one
thinks of RFRA, it should be apparent that it is part of a larger pattern of Congress concerning itself with rights issues. This substantiates my point that in contemporary American democracy, all
branches of government are concerned consistently with rights and,
generally speaking, act to create, promote and enforce important
constitutional rights. Second, my argument shows that the Supreme
Court does not act solely to advance the rights of minorities. In fact,
on numerous occasions the Court has destroyed their constitutional
rights. 65

I enumerated the relevant instances earlier, but a reminder

is appropriate: the Court limited the effectiveness of the Voting
Rights Act in City of Mobile," set back the effort against race and sex
discrimination in Grove City College and Wards Cove,6 struck down
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994).
' 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001).
' Id. at 964.
See id. at 963.
" See i at 964-68.
SeeAlexander v. Sandoval, 121 S. Ct. 1511 (2001) (holding there is no private right of action to enforce disparate impact regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964).
" City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (holding that Mobile's at-large electoral system did not violate the Fifteenth Amendment and that the Voting Rights Act is intended to
have an effect no different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself).
' Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (holding that a federally assisted program
must be identified before Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, prohibiting sex discrimination in education, is triggered).
' Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (holding that an employee claiming race discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 must demonstrate both disparate im-
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RFRA in City of Boerne,6 hurt the effectiveness of the law against age
discrimination in Kime465 damaged the ability of the legal system to
fight gender-motivated
violence in Morison,66 and dented the ADA in
67
Garrett.
B. The Rights Revolution Creates a Democracy of Rights
The systematic concern shown by the political branches for questions of rights is something new. Indeed, for most of American history the political branches (along with the Supreme Court itself) were
not terribly concerned with providing a national guarantee of civil
rights to all citizens. At the same time, we can be relatively certain
that this new concern with rights is not a passing phenomenon. It
came about because of a structural change in American politics and a
constitutional change that the political branches themselves helped
create. These changes are the ultimate product of the civil rights
movement, a broad-based social, political, and legal effort which is
still reshaping American politics long after it effectively ended.6 One
of these ongoing changes is the politicization of rights issues, which
has altered the Supreme Court nomination process and the Court itself. In this Section, I will attempt to demonstrate these points and
their meaning for the concept of a democracy of rights.
Our contemporary democracy of rights is based on an ideal of
citizenship that consists of an effective national guarantee of civil
rights, including the right to vote. 9 Although this ideal is accepted
uncritically today, this was not always the case. It is apparent that we
can speak of a democracy of rights as a development that occurred
only after the Civil War. Prior to the war, the single institution of
slavery is enough to deny the United States the status of a democracy
of rights. It should not be assumed, however, that after the adoption
pact and a specific employment practice, not only statistical disparities in the employer's
workforce).
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that the RFRA was unconstitutional
because it allowed considerable congressional intrusion into the states' general authority to
regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens, specifically the denial of church building
permits).
0 Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that state employee could
not sue the state for money damages under the ADEA, because the statute invalidly abrogated
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity).
6 United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000) (holding that gender-motivated violent
crimes were not within Congress' power to regulate, and thus a private remedy was outside
Congress' power to enact).
67 Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001).
See discussion supra text accompanying
notes 56-59.
0 For an account of the Reconstruction's impact on the authority of the government to enforce civil rights, see POST & SIEGEL, supranote 49, at 486-502.
'0 See generally KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONsTrruTION (1989) (arguing that the courts play a crucial role in unifying the country by
guaranteeing equal citizenship through the Fourteenth Amendment).
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of the Reconstruction Amendments the United States enjoyed a
steady progress toward the kind of democracy we have in the present.
During the Progressive era, for example, standards for government
turned in a distinctly anti-democratic direction.7 °
On balance, despite such improvements as the direct election of
senators and the extension of suffrage to (white) women, the United
States moved towards less democratic politics during the Progressive
years. The political aspirations of African-Americans, poor whites,
and Populists were suppressed by force and fraud. 7' Attempts by
workers to organize unions were met by a devastating combination of
court decisions and unrestrained violence. Business used omnibus
labor injunctions to throw a net over all political activity in workingclass communities while it used the state to suppress civil liberties. 2
As Eric Foner concludes,
[t]aken as a whole, the electoral changes of the Progressive era represented a significant and ironic reversal of the nineteenth-century trend
toward manhood suffrage and a rejection of the venerable idea that voting was an inalienable right of American citizenship ....In the name of
improving democracy, millions of men-mostly blacks, immigrants, and
other workers-were eliminated
from the voting rolls, even as millions of
73
white women were added.

The contemporary democracy of rights in which we live differs in
many significant respects not only from the kind of white republican
government endorsed by the Founders,74 but also from the "purified"
democracy of Progressive reformers.5 First, we recognize the importance of a national guarantee of civil rights, backed by effective enforcement agencies. These civil rights are truly universal in that they
apply to all citizens and include political rights, including the right to
vote and to run for office. There are no property, class, race, or sexbased restrictions on the exercise of any civil right. Second, unlike
70

In what follows, I draw on my discussion of this topic in GRIFFIN, supranote 6, at 102-04.

71 See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,
(1988); LAWRENCE GOODWYN, DEMOCRATIC PROMISE:

1863-1877 at 598

THE POPULIST MOVEMENT IN AMERICA

299-300, 304-05 (1976) (providing an account of the communication and finance problems the
Populists faced).

97

. See WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 59(1991); HAROLD G. VATTER, THE DRIVE TO INDUSTRIAL MATURIY: THE U.S. ECONOMY,1860-

1914 at 280-81, 296 (1975) (describing the national resistance to organized labor and business's
refusal to collectively bargain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).

" ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 154 (1998). See also MICHAEL SCHUDSON,
THE GOOD CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE 182-85 (1998) (describing how the
Progressive Era's emphasis on a voter of intelligence and a pure citizenship led to electoral reforms that made legal citizenship, literacy, and the ability to pay a poll tax requisites of the
vote).
74 GRIFFIN, supra note 6, at 74-75 ("As the founding generation ... understood the matter, a
republican, liberal, and democratic constitutional order was not possible unless the American
population was white ....White supremacy was thus an integral assumption of the 1787 Constitution.").
75 See SCHUDSON, supra note 73 at 182-85 (describing the "purification of citizenship" in the

Progressive Era).
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the Founders, we accept the institutions of political parties and interest groups as legitimate means of organizing citizens for political participation. 76 Third, we accept (to a certain extent) a "populist" form
of democracy in which all of the elected branches are understood to
be directly elected by the people (the electoral college notwithstanding), and there is a direct role for public opinion in the form of polls,
initiatives, and referenda. Fourth, unlike both the Founders and
Progressives, we reject slavery, white supremacy, and racial discrimination as well as any doctrines of states' rights and federalism that
support a system of racial oppression. Neither the Founders nor Progressives would have accepted the kind of multi-racial, multi-ethnic
society and government that we take for granted.
Recent scholarship on the history of democracy and citizenship
seems to agree that these principles do not originate in the Founding
era, Reconstruction, the Progressive era, or even the New Deal. The
proximate origin of our contemporary democracy of rights is the
"rights revolution" led by the civil rights movement. 7 In his insightful
history, Michael Schudson argues that the "struggle of blacks for inclusion in the body politic would prove the fountainhead for a new
understanding of citizenship." 8 This movement did not simply lead
to the end of segregation and the long-overdue extension of voting
rights to African-Americans. It redefined democracy, citizenship, and
rights for all Americans. This "revolution in rights" led to "a growing
inclination of people and organized groups to define politics in terms
of rights, a growing willingness of the federal government to enforce
individuals' claims to constitutional rights, and a widening of the
domain of 'politics' propelled by rights-consciousness."79
At some point in the early 1960s, a political logic took hold in
which the elected branches of government perceived distinct rewards
for approving civil rights legislation. This was a sign that the United
States was becoming a democracy of rights. Once nearly all Americans had full citizenship rights, the constitutional logic of separated
and divided power began to work for civil rights policy as well as it did
with respect to other policy matters. That is, if state and local governments violated civil rights, citizens could turn to the elected
branches, as well as the Supreme Court, for assistance. If, on the
other hand, the Court failed to protect civil rights, citizens could turn
to the elected branches for redress. Past experience was not of much
use in understanding this new reality since the United States was not
a democracy of rights for most of its history.

7 On the Founders' rejection of these institutions, see id. at 54-55, 87.
77 See FONER, supra note 73, at 299-305 (describing the development of protection of rights
by the Supreme Court in the 1960s); SCHUDSON, supranote 73, at 245-74 (providing a history of
the development of legal rights in the twentieth century).
SCHUDSON, supranote 73, at 231.
' &id
at 242.
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A democracy of rights is thus a recent and valuable achievement.
Historicizing the concept of democracy has significant implications
for the traditional argument about the legitimacy of judicial review.
From the perspective of those who support judicial review, it has always been important to point out the historic role the Supreme Court
has played in protecting the rights of Americans against the excesses
of majoritarian democracy."0 Of course, careful students of judicial
enforcement of the Bill of Rights know that Court decisions protecting these rights are largely a phenomenon of the twentieth century.l
Still, there is no doubt that Court decisions protecting valuable constitutional rights antedate the civil rights movement. But this reality
does not show that the Court has been protecting us against democracy. It shows rather that the Court was able to protect some rights in
an era in which the United States had yet to achieve the status of a
democracy of rights.
Furthermore, Charles Epp's valuable study of the "supportstructure" of the rights revolution makes clear that Court decisions
that are part of the civil rights movement were themselves the product of a democratization of access to the federal judiciary. That is,
the Court did not simply act on its own to protect individual rights
against majoritarian attack. It acted with the support of groups of
citizens who summoned significant resources in a quest to protect
rights. Exercising their democratic rights to organize to the extent
possible, these citizens provided a crucial impetus for Court decisions
that defended the rights of the individual. As Epp asserts, "sustained
judicial attention and approval for individual rights grew primarily
out of pressure from below, not leadership from above. " ' This support-structure is, if anything, more robust today than it was in the
formative years of the civil rights movement. It provides a democratic
medium ensuring that issues relating to the protection of rights are
constantly on the public agenda.
The new interest of the political branches in protecting rights is
thus not a transitory phenomenon. It derives from the changes made
by the rights revolution, changes that affected the very nature of

See ROBERT H. WIEBE, SELF RULE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN DEMoCRACY 241
(1995) (citing, for example, Nadine Strossen, president of the ACLU, who "called upon the
Supreme Court in 1991 to fulfill 'its traditional historic role as the unique protector of [such]
fundamental constitutional rights' as the individual's 'privacy and freedom and autonomy'").
8' See, e.g., CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME
COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1-2 (1998) (describing how less than ten percent of the
Court's decisions involved individual rights in the 1930s, but almost seventy percent of its decisions involved individual rights by the late 1960s).
See id. at 48-70 (describing how the "growth of a support structure for legal mobilizationconsisting of rights-advocacy organizations, a diverse and organizationally sophisticated legal
profession, a broad array of financing sources, and federal rights-advocacy efforts-propelled
new rights issues onto the Supreme Court's agenda").
' Id. at 2.
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American democracy. As long as Americans formulate their political
demands in terms of rights, this new form of politics will continue.
One might mark the beginning of this new form of politics at the
moment all three branches of government embraced the agenda of
the civil rights movement. Even as the movement was winning its signal victories, however, the ground was laid for a conservative response
that would eventually affect the membership and role of the Supreme
Court. I will exaggerate a bit to make my point more clearly. Beginning in the Nixon Administration, the Court's efforts to assist racial
minorities were undermined as it was penetrated by agents of a new
conservative majority. A Court that better reflected the full range of
American racial attitudes could no longer be counted on to advance
consistently the goals of the civil rights movement.
This shift can be traced to the recent history of the Supreme
Court appointment process. As Mark Silverstein and David Yalof
have demonstrated,84 this process has undergone a qualitative change
centered on a new awareness that took root in the 1960s that the Supreme Court was playing an important role in setting the national
policy agenda. Prior to that time, senators and politicians generally
did not necessarily perceive the Court as an important policy actor.
As Silverstein states, "[w]ith few exceptions, appointments to the Supreme Court were of little electoral import to senators .... [U]ntil

the Warren Court revolution of the 1960's, the nature of judicial
power did not make judicial appointments critical events for potent
political forces."8 As the Court became more important politically,
senators and presidents took notice.
The Reagan Administration made appointments to the federal
bench an important part of its overall political strategy. Silverstein
notes,
before the Reagan presidency executive scrutiny of potential nominees to
lower federal courts was haphazard at best and limited by respect for
senatorial patronage. Under Reagan, however, the President's Committee on Federal Judicial Selection, consisting of key members of the White
House staff and the Justice Department, was formed to screen judicial
appointments and allow the administration to apply a consistent ideological measure.

16

Yalof expands on Silverstein's account by describing the Reagan
Administration's effort to anticipate vacancies on the Supreme Court.

" See MARK

SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES:

THE NEW POLITICS OF SUPREME COURT

CoNFIRMATIoNs (1994) (providing "an appreciation of the evolving political and legal contexts
in which the transition from the politics of acquiescence to the politics of confrontation has
taken place"); DAVID ALISTAlI YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE
SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (1999) (relating how presidents since World War II
have selected nominees to serve on the Supreme Court in the context of a high-stakes political
event).
' SILVERSTEIN, supranote 84, at 141.
Id at 120-21 (footnotes omitted).
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When Edwin Meese became Attorney General at the beginning of
Reagan's second term, he created a task force to find potential
nominees to the Court should a vacancy open up." The task force
identified twelve factors to be taken into account in assessing nominees. Among them were such items as: "awareness of the importance
of strictjusticiability and procedural requirements"; "refusal to create
new constitutional rights for the individual"; "deference to states in
their spheres"; "recognition that the federal government is one of
enumerated powers"; and "respect for traditional values."8 The task
force looked for federal judges who met the requirements and produced a report for each judge reviewing their opinions. Yalof notes,
"[n] ever before in history had there been such an excruciatingly detailed examination of judicial rulings by the Justice Department in
anticipation of a Supreme Court nomination."
When a presidential administration goes looking for Supreme
Court nominees who believe that it is unwise to create new constitutional rights, it is evident that we are no longer in a world in which
minorities can count on the Court. Again, to exaggerate somewhat,
once majorities realized that certain Court decisions were contrary to
their interests, they resolved to put their own representatives on the
Court. This created a new Supreme Court appointment process, one
that has been politicized and democratized. Silverstein concludes:
[t]he current [Supreme Court confirmation] process is disorderly, contentious, and unpredictable. In short, it is now a thoroughly democratic
process, and the increased public participation in the selection of federal
judges and Supreme Court justices is a consequence of profound
changes in American politics and institutions. The most important 9de0
velopment is the heightened activism of the modem federaljudiciary.

It is important to note that when I refer to the Supreme Court appointment process as politicized, I am not referring to partisanship.
The party factor must always be considered in assessing any action by
Congress, but to simply think of the appointment process as newly
partisan would miss the point. Those who think along the lines of
partisanship might be inclined to believe that the process can be altered by means of procedural reforms that might produce a less contentious nomination atmosphere. A less contentious process is certainly possible, but this would not reduce in the slightest what I mean
by politicization. Politicization is a function of the degree of importance rival political groups attach to the Court and judicial nominations. Ever since the Warren Court, politicians have perceived the
Court as an institution that can affect their goals and political

SeeYALOF, supra note 84, at 143-44.
I& at 143-44.
Id. at 144.
o SILVERSTEIN, supranote 84, at 6 (footnote omitted).
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agenda. This guarantees the politicization I describe, regardless of
how contentious the nomination process is or becomes.
Once the Court is politicized, it is no longer possible for it to
achieve the independence from politics required to maintain a consistent posture with respect to the protection of individual rights. 9'

Of course, if one political party continuously dominated the presidency and the Senate, the appointment process might well produce a
Court that was fairly cohesive. For better or worse, we do not live in
such a world.2 The contemporary Court has thus become another
forum in which political battles over individual rights are played out.
It is closely balanced between the contending sides and each presidential election and possible vacancy is monitored for its potential
impact on constitutional issues.3 Indeed, the politicization of the
appointment process makes it unlikely that the Court can perform a
special function in educating the citizenry or assuming a vanguard
role to promote a national dialogue on rights. 94 Instead, politicization ensnares the Court in the same contentious politics of rights that
occupies the political branches.
While I suggested above that the Court has been taken over by
agents of the majority, this is too simple. When all three branches of
government are in the business of protecting constitutional rights,
the vocabulary of the "countermajoritarian difficulty," with its contrast between majoritarian legislatures and a minoritarian Court, no
longer makes sense. In our democracy of rights, the issue becomes
not under what circumstances constitutional rights should be protected against legislative incursion, but rather what rights should be
created, who should enforce them, and which institutionshould have
the last word with respect to their scope and meaning. The issue becomes fundamentally comparative, because in a politicized climate it
is unlikely that any branch will have a special institutional advantage
when it comes to defending individual rights.
It therefore becomes important to ask whether there is good reason to think that the political branches are at least as good (if not
better) than the judiciary in creating, promoting, and enforcing con-

' Mark Graber provides an incisive argument in support of this position in the context of
abortion. See MARK A. GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION: EQUAL CHOICE, THE CONsTITUTION,
AND REPRODUCMVE POLITICS 121-31 (1996).
" It is worth keeping in mind that the last president who was able to appoint a five-member
majority to the Court was Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Recent presidents have not been as fortunate.
" See, e.g., Stuart TaylorJr., The TippingPoin, NAT'L.,June 10, 2000, at 1810 (discussing the
impact of past presidential elections on the make up of the Supreme Court, and predicting possible effect of the 2000 presidential election on the Court); Kirk Victor, A Ticking Time Bomb in
the Senate, NAT'LJ., Feb. 7, 2001, at 490 (discussing potential battles in the Senate over President
Bush's future Supreme Court nominees).
For an argument that the Court can perform these roles, see, e.g., 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERicAN CONSTrTTONAL LAW 27 (3d ed. 2000).
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stitutional and legal rights. This involves inquiring into the relationship between rights and deliberation within democratic theory.
C. Rights and Deliberationin Democratic Theory
One of the problems with the countermajoritarian critique of judicial review was that it never bothered to justify democracy as a
value. The desirability of democracy was simply assumed." But this
theoretical failure on the part of those who insisted that judicial review was "deviant"96 in a democracy led to a corresponding underestimation of the value and purpose of democracy by scholars who responded to the countermajoritarian critique. The legal scholars who
defended judicial review paid scant attention to what democracy
means and why some have thought it a good form of government. In
a fundamental sense, the whole debate over the legitimacy of judicial
review took place with one of the main characters, democracy, offstage and unexamined.
To restore democracy to its proper place, we must focus on normative arguments and set aside the assumption that voting procedures like majority rule are the best place to start in understanding
why democracy is desirable. I suggest the insistence by a number of
democratic theorists that democracy is the one form of government
that is in the common interest is a good place to start. As Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson put it, democracy "is a conception of
government that accords equal respect to the moral claims of each
citizen, and is therefore morally justifiable from the perspective of
each citizen." 97 Robert Dahl, 9s Thomas Christiano,99 and Rex Martinl °°
have also made some form of this argument. These theorists all stress
that what is important about democracy is not majority rule in the
first instance, but rather a commitment to treat citizens equally and
ensure that the actual operation of government works to advance the
interests of everyone.
Rex Martin has made a particularly important version of this argument that has implications for how constitutional and legal rights
' I developed this argument in detail in my own critique of the scholars who challenged
judicial review on democratic grounds. See Stephen M. Griffin, What Is Constitutional Theory?
The Newer Theory and the Decline of the Learned Tradition, 62 S. CALIF. L. REV. 493, 506-15 (1989)
(arguing that scholars who have challenged judicial review on democratic grounds fail to acknowledge differing conceptions of democracy that might call into question the nature of the
American political system).
'
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 18 (1962) (arguing that judicial
review is an outlier in the American democratic system because the judicial branch is not electorally accountable).
" SeeAMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACYAND DISAGREEMENT 26 (1996).
See ROBERTA. DAHL, DEMOCRACYAND ITS CRrTCS (1989).
See THOMAS CHRISTIANO, THE RULE OF THE MANY: FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN DEMOCRATIC

THEORY (1996).
lC See REX MARTIN, A SYSTEM OF RIGHTS (1993).
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fit into a democratic order. 1 ' Martin's theory is intended to show
that a harmony exists between democracy and the protection of basic
civil rights.'0 2 In his account, civil rights are defined as political rights
universal within a given society. 3 They are beneficial ways of acting,
or ways of being treated, that are specifically recognized and affirmed
in law for all citizens. Thus, all civil rights are beneficial to the
rightholder and can easily be seen as part of the good of each citizen
or instrumental to it. New rights can be established if a reasonable
argument can be made that they would be in the interest of all citizens.
If civil rights are indeed beneficial, they can be regarded as justified given that they identify ways of acting, or ways of being acted toward, that satisfy the criterion of mutual perceived benefit. That is,
civil rights are valuable because they are in everyone's interest. Given
this, it is plausible that people might come to see the creation and
promotion of civil rights as not simply one goal among many, but the
principal political objective of their society. They would therefore
give a certain priority to civil rights.
Once a priority has been given to civil rights, however, the question becomes how best to implement that priority in a system of government. Practical experience suggests that for rights to be truly
meaningful, a set of institutions will be required to create, enforce,
and harmonize them.' 4 Democratic practices such as universal suffrage with regular and contested elections could serve as a foundation for the institutions necessary to protect civil rights. This is so because democratic procedures are a reliable way of identifying, and
then implementing, laws and policies that serve the common interests of all citizens or, at least, a large number of citizens.
Here, however, it is important to understand that the notion of
what is in the common interest is deeply ambiguous because it involves a number of concepts that should remain distinct. Common
interests can be understood as (1) those policies and laws that are in
the interest of each and all; or (2) those policies and laws concerned,

101See

id.
' In what follows, I draw directly on the argument presented in Rex Martin & Stephen M.

Griffin, ConstitutionalRights andDemocracy in the U.S.A.: The lssue ofJudicialReview,8 RATIOJURIS
180, 187-92 (1995).
' On Martin's account, each civil right has a core content that can be individuated (given
out equally to all individuals in a certain class) and distributed in a determinate amount under
publicly recognized rules. Judicial or administrative agencies must exist in order to assure the
distribution of civil rights as a benefit to each person in the class. See MARTIN, supranote 100, at
126.
...
Martin emphasizes:
[t]he indispensable role of political agencies and of institutional processes in the development of rights. Such agencies, acting in concert, are required in order to formulate
civil rights, to promote and maintain them (as is necessary, if they are to be more than
merely nominal rights), and to harmonize them through judicious drafting.
MARTTN, supranote 100, at 124.
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for example, with national defense or the growth of the economy,
that is, concerned with things that are in the collective interest of society (though not necessarily in the particular interest of each citizen); or (3) those policies and laws that are in the interest of most
citizens (presumably a majority) though not in the interest of others
(presumably a minority).' 0 '
Unless an order of priority is chosen among these different concepts, democratic institutions might operate to promote laws and
rights that were only in the interest of a majority, rather than in the
interest of all. On reflection, then, anticipating the possibility of conflicts, citizens would value category (1), policies in the interest of
each and all, over categories (2) and (3) and they would ftirther
choose policies in category (2) over category (3) .6

This means that

policies shown clearly to be in the interest of most citizens could not
conflict with or take priority over the rights justified in terms of the
definition of common interests in category (1). In such a way, the
basic rationale for democratic government, that it is in the interest of
everyone, would be refined to ensure that laws and policies in the interest of each and all would be the principal political goal of society.
So far the argument has been that democratic government can
provide the setting required by civil rights. Democracy also needs to
be justified, but giving priority to preferences shared by each and all
can provide this justification and such preferences would include
universal political (civil) rights. Thus two independent elementscivil rights and democratic procedures-can be systematically
brought together and shown to be mutually supportive. They are
mutually supportive because they are grounded in the same
justification, one founded on the idea of mutual perceived benefit.
Since democratic procedures are relatively good at identifying
policies that are in everyone's interest, over time democratic institutions will tend toward the creation and enforcement of civil rights.
That is, they will tend to produce new rights on a continuous basis.
Only a tendency can be posited, given the inherent imperfections of
democratic institutions. These imperfections mean that we will never
be able to say that literally all civil rights laws are in the interest of
each and all, but we do have adequate evidence for saying that longestablished civil rights are in that interest. Long-established civil
rights are those approved by legislative majorities and those that survived the scrutiny of time, experience, and public discussion and have

- See id. at 163.
The basic reasoning as to why citizens would prefer category (1) is that civil rights (which
are, in effect, universal benefits given to all citizens) can be individuated in some determinate
degree and that benefit each citizen. By contrast, the policies and laws in categories (2) and (3)
provide benefits, but cannot be guaranteed to benefit each citizen in a determinate amount.
Civil rights (again, universal political rights) would therefore be preferred over aggregative or
majority benefits. See id. at 153-66.
'06
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thus been winnowed by the self-correcting character of the democratic process.
Within this democratic system of rights, judicial review can be justified rather easily as a check on majority rule designed to ensure that
civil rights are not infringed. As the above argument implied, there is
no guarantee that legislative majorities will always choose the interest
of everyone over the interest of a large majority of voters. The priority accorded to civil rights may be the principal objective of government, but that is not to say it is unlikely that laws will be passed that
violate the rights of individual citizens. Therefore, checking devices
such as judicial review are appropriate to ensure that democratic institutions continue working toward that principal objective. Once
justified in this way, however, it becomes clear that such checks are
not external to democratic ideals or in any way are undemocratic.
They are, rather, to be numbered among the fundamental democratic institutions. This harmony between checking devices such as
judicial review and democracy flows from the more foundational idea
of a harmony in principle between basic civil rights and democratic
institutions.
At the same time, this reasoning implies that ifjudicial review (or
any other checking device) starts to work against civil rights that are
in the interest of each and all, then other procedures and institutions
will be required to again guide the system toward its goal. For while it
is important to acknowledge that legislative majorities can impair
rights, the more fundamental tendency of a democratic system of
rights is constantly to create new rights and ensure that the rights already on the books are enforced. In such a democracy, legislators
and policymakers that successfully create and enforce civil rights generally can count on public favor because such rights are correctly
perceived to be in everyone's interest.
The argument that there is a harmony between civil rights and
democracy thus has subtle implications for the traditional debate
over the legitimacy ofjudicial review. In what I have called a democracy of rights (one that realizes this harmony), judicial review is not
brought in to adjust the system toward a goal (the protection of
rights) that the system does not naturally achieve on its own. Rather,
the pointof having a democracy is that it does tend to regularly achieve
the successful creation and enforcement of basic civil rights. Judicial
review is simply an additional institution that can help achieve this
goal.
A democracy of rights aims at identifying policies that are in the
bommon interest. It is a democracy because in some sense everyone's
views are valued and respected. It is a democracy of rights because
civil rights tend to be political goods that are in the common interest.
But how does this happen exactly? So far, I have not addressed the
process by which citizens in a democracy of rights reach a collective
judgment about what policies are in the common interest. Here
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Gutmann's and Thompson's emphasis on the necessity for deliberation in a democracy is helpful.' °7 Deliberation means citizens are expected to argue with one another in the face of disagreement over
moral and political values.' 3 Gutmann and Thompson contend that
one reason for requiring democratic deliberation is that it "responds
to the incomplete understanding that characterizes moral conflict in
politics. Compared to other methods of decision making, deliberation increases the chances of arriving atjustifiable policies.""°
This reasoning dovetails nicely with the rationale I presented for a
democracy of rights. The benefit of living in a democracy is that
compared with other systems of government, democracies tend to
most readily identify policies in the common interest. Encouraging
citizens to argue over issues of moral and political principle helps
achieve this goal by informing everyone of the views of others, ensuring that mistakes will be identified and corrected and increasing the
likelihood that citizens will "develop new views and policies that are
more widely justifiable."" °
Widening the circle of deliberation makes it more likely that citizens will be able to find their way to the common interest. Gutmann
and Thompson stress that deliberation is especially important for
what they call "middle democracy""' where laws are applied on a dayto-day basis by government officials and to the vibrant politics that
occurs in interest groups, civic associations, and schools."" 2 So deliberation is a value not simply for one branch of government, but for
all branches and levels of government, all private groups concerned
with politics and for citizens at large.
At this point Gutmann and Thompson comment directly on the
tendency of legal scholars to see the Supreme Court as the government institution best suited for deliberation. 13 As I have argued
elsewhere,"' lawyers tend to contrast an ideal Court to the nonideal
world of Congress and argue that the quality of deliberation in the
former is always superior to the latter. Gutmann and Thompson note
appropriately, "[e]mpirical evidence about the behavior of judges
"5
and legislators is almost never offered to support the contrast. 1
They remark that such arguments rest on a "deductive institutionalism""' that does not capture the way courts and legislatures actually
operate.

See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supranote 97, at 39-51.
See id. at 39-41.
"9 I&at 43.
"0
'

110 1&

.. Id.at 40.
112 d.

...
See id at 45-47.
.. See GRIFFIN, supra note 6, at 123.
"' GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supranote 97, at 45.
116Ig
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Frank Cross has recently offered a catalog of arguments to show
that deliberation in the Supreme Court may actually be worse than deliberation in the political branches.17 The limited size of the Court
makes it a poor forum for deliberation in a multi-racial, multi-ethnic,
multi-cultural society."" Even if we imagine a Court that is more diverse than at present, the upper limit of nine members means that
legislatures will always be superior in this respect. The advocacy of
the parties in a given case cannot make up for the Court's lack of diversity and perspective because they tend to be self-interested and
"many interested parties, such as the general public, are not present
before the Court." '9 In addition, the justices tend to be policy generalists rather than experts. The Court is simply too small to enable the
Justices to attain the kind of specialized policy expertise that is taken
for granted in the elected branches. 2 0 Finally, the fact-finding resources available to legislatures will always be superior to those of the
federal courts.
Cross's arguments suggest that there may be areas of constitutional law in which the political branches actually have a deliberative
advantage over the Supreme Court. In Part II, I will argue that this
has been borne out in three main areas of equal protection law: affirmative action, racial redistricting, and Congress' power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment.
II. EQUAL PROTECrION IN A DEMOCRACY OF RIGHTS

In a democracy of rights, there is good reason for thinking that
rights created by the political branches through a deliberative process
are in the common interest. Therefore, when the Supreme Court
renders decisions destroying those rights, there is reason to be concerned. This is precisely what has been going on in the law of equal
protection. The Court has acted against civil rights produced not
simply by a "majoritarian" political process, but by a democratic process, which embodies a form of deliberation that is superior to anything the Court can offer.
A. Affirmative Action
City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.12 is well known to students of the
Equal Protection Clause as the case in which a majority of the Supreme Court finally settled on strict scrutiny as the standard to be
"' SeeFrank B. Cross, Institutionsand Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 CoRNEL L. REV. 1529,
1545-50 (2000).
Id. at 1546-47.
& at 1547.
d.
'" See id. at 1546-47.
"2 See id. at 1548-49.

488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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applied to "race-based measures to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination."123 At issue was an ordinance adopted by the Richmond
City Council that required thirty percent of city construction con24
tracts to be subcontracted to businesses run by racial minorities.
The purpose of the ordinance was to benefit
construction firms
125
owned and operated by African-Americans.
Croson features a debate among members of the Court as to the
appropriate standard of review to be used in affirmative action cases
that involve race-conscious remedies. Writing for the Court, Justice
O'Connor insisted on strict scrutiny, while Justice Marshall in dissent continued to apply the "intermediate scrutiny" standard he had
first set forth in University of CaliforniaRegents v. Bakke.127 For my purposes, however, I want to consider Croson from the perspective of a
democracy of rights-that is, I want to concentrate on the role of deliberation and rights. In Croson, the Supreme Court destroyed a valuable legal right, one adopted through a deliberative process to advance the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
In adopting its thirty percent ordinance, Richmond was following
the example of Congress, 2 8 which had approved a ten percent minority business set-aside in the Public Works Employment Act of 1977.'2
Congress acted pursuant to extensive findings of racial discrimination
against minority businesses in general and in the awarding of government contracts."
The predominantly black City Council of
Richmond, Virginia knew full well that the effects of past and present
discrimination against African-Americans continued to prevent minority businesses from gaining any significant share of public contracts." The Council believed that public money should not be used
to reinforce ongoing practices of racial discrimination. The Council
therefore granted a valuable legal right to minority businesses, one
that enabled them to participate more effectively in the awarding of
public contracts.
This legal right to a certain share of public contracts had an important constitutional dimension. A general purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is to provide a guarantee of equal citizenship to
all Americans.'
The Equal Protection Clause implements this purpose by encouraging all branches of government to provide a legal
'

Id. at 476-77.

Id. at 477.
Id. at 479-80.
2 See id. at 493-94.
"n 438 U.S. 265, 359-62 (1978) (holding that racial classifications designed to further remedial purposes need only serve important governmental objectives and be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives).
'2
See Croson, 488 U.S. at 530-35 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
'29 Public Works EmploymentAct of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116, tit. I (1977).
"* See Croson, 488 U.S. at 531-33 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
...
Id. at 534-35.
1
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
'"
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regime that counters the present effects of the past systems of slavery
and white supremacy and additionally works against any tendencies
in the present toward racial discrimination. Richmond's minority
business ordinance advanced the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause by establishing a new
legal regime that made it more difficult for racial discrimination to
influence who received city contracts.
The adoption of minority set-asides by Congress and in cities like
Richmond was part of a general public reconsideration in the 1970s
of the measures that would be necessary to truly implement the
promise of the Fourteenth Amendment. At the local level, action was
often prompted by the election of the first black mayors and majorityblack city councils.'33 These developments, which were the product of
the civil rights movement, showed that the nature of public deliberation on issues of race had changed. Demands for black participation
were based on a belief that true equality required vigorous "affirmative" action by government in the present, not a reliance on vague
promises of a remote future in which racial discrimination would
somehow be eliminated.
Set-asides for minority groups in public contracting emerged out
of this more inclusive public debate. They provided new legal rights
to obtain a greater share of public contracts. When the Supreme
Court entered the picture in Croson, it abrogated the results of this
public discussion even though none of the justices of the majority
understood what it was about. The Court noted that the City Council
had concluded that there was racial discrimination in the Richmond
construction industry, but said that "a generalized assertion that there
has been past discrimination in an entire industry provides no guidance for a legislative body to determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy." 13
Note initially that this statement appears to stand the separation
of powers on its head. Legislatures or city councils are in a good position to gather general sorts of evidence and make general findings.
What they are not good at is making determinations of wrongdoing
and defining the "precise" scope of injuries suffered by specific firms.
That is normally ajob for the courts. In any event, the point of the
set-asides was to create a legal regime more favorable to minority
businesses and less susceptible to the influence of racial discrimination. It was based on the particular experience of city council members and their knowledge of racial discrimination in Richmond gen-

'" For a description of an important case of minority participation in the building of a new
airport in Atlanta, see GARY M. POMERANTZ, WHERE PEACHTREE MEETS SWEET AUBURN: THE
SAGA OF TWO FAMILIES AND THE MAKING OF ATLANTA 458-60 (1996). For a discussion of governmental efforts to assist minority firms in New Orleans, see Mark Schleifstein, Remedying the
Past THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 26,2001, at A-10.
.. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498.
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erally and in the awarding of public contracts' 35 (which the Court
conceded).' 3 6
From the perspective of a democracy of rights, the Croson decision
did not advance public deliberation about affirmative action because
it imposed a standard suitable for the judiciary on a legislative body.
Since this standard could not be met, it had the effect of stifling minority set-asides even as those concerned with public contracting
knew perfectly well that racial discrimination and lack of opportunity
for minority firms continued to exist. By destroying rights designed
to fulfill the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court
13 7
helped perpetuate existing racial discrimination.
Contrast this with the situation that would exist if heightened
scrutiny were eliminated. Under a regime where rational basis review
was the only standard, the Court's inquiry would be properly directed
at whether the legislature had good reason to believe that a set-aside
program would improve opportunities for minority businesses.
There is, of course, no question of this and so the Richmond program would have been found constitutional.
B. Race and CongressionalDistricting
In Shaw v. Reno," the Supreme Court recognized a new cause of
action for "racial gerrymandering" in congressional districting under
the Equal Protection Clause. 39 This cause of action enabled the
white plaintiffs in Shaw to challenge congressional districts drawn
pursuant to a process established by the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 (VRA).'40 As I noted in Part I, Congress adopted those
amendments
to nullify the effect of the Court's ruling in City of Mo141
bile.
In Shaw, the Court did not refer to the process established by the
VRA. The Court did, however, voice its concern that the unusual
shape of the district under challenge raised the inference of racial
gerrymandering. The redistricting plan questioned in Shaw was defined as "redistricting legislation that is so extremely irregular on its
face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the

"

See id. at 534-35 (Marshall,J, dissenting).
1Id.at 499.

"7 See PatriciaJ. Williams, The ObligingShell" An InformalEssay on FormalEqual Opportunity, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2128, 2128-30 (1989) (discussing the legal rhetoric that prevented a minority setaside program from succeeding in the Croson case).
"s 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993).
'- See id.at 642 (holding that "redistricting legislation that is so extremely irregular on its
face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting" violates the Equal Protection Clause).
", 138 Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131.
...
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980). See discussion supra text accompanying
note 61.
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races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional 1districting
2
principles and without sufficiently compelling justification.
In Shaw, the Court recognized a new cause of action, but did not
decide whether the districting process under review was unconstitutional. However, as Peter Rubin notes, "since Shaw the Court has in
fact invalidated every district line drawn on the basis of race that it
has considered in a fully briefed and argued case."
The most
prominent cases are Miller v. Johnson,44 involving congressional districting in Georgia, Bush v. Vera,145 examining the same process in
Texas, and Shaw v. Hunt,46 a North Carolina case that was the direct
follow-up to Shaw v. Reno.
Voting rights experts have criticized Shaw v. Reno on many
grounds. Critics have argued that a cause of action for "racial gerrymandering" is itself contrary to the Equal Protection Clause since
there is no reasonable chance that this cause of action will be available to black plaintiffs;4 that the Supreme Court ignored its normal
standing requirements; 49 that Shaw was clearly inconsistent with prior
precedents; and that its reasoning simply made no sense."" While
all of these criticisms are cogent and important, for my purposes I
would like to bypass them in favor of focusing once again on how the
Court treated civil rights created by the political branches through
democratic deliberation.
The VRA and its 1982 amendments granted valuable rights to racial minorities. The 1982 amendments established that voting rights
were violated if it were shown that "political processes.., are not

Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642.
' PeterJ. Rubin, ReconnectingDoctrineand Purpose: A ComprehensiveApproach to Strict Scrutiny
AfterAdarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 53 (2000) (footnote omitted). But see Hunt v.
Cromartie, 121 S.Ct. 1452 (2001) (holding that North Carolina's twelfth congressional district
is constitutional) (reh'gdenied 121 S. Ct. 2239 (2001)).
.. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
"
517 U.S. 952 (1996).
"
517 U.S. 899 (1996).
"'See, e.g.J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJusTICE: MINORriYVOTING RIGHTS AND THE
UNDOING OF THE SEcoND RECONSTRUCTION 377 (1999) (arguing that Shaw and its successors
"invented facts" and "distorted history"); Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court's
Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. Cr. REV. 245 (claiming that Shaw upset well-settled doctrine of
equal protection law and turned its back on the entire fabric of the law of standing); Pamela S.
Karlan & DarylJ. Levinson, Why Voting Is Differen 84 CAL. L. REv. 1201 (1996) (asserting that
Shaw's attempt to integrate voting rights law into the Court's general approach to affirmative
action is misguided and incoherent);Jamin B. Raskin, The Supreme Court'sRacialDouble Standard
in Redistricting. UnequalProtection in Politics and the Scholarship that Defends It, 14J.L. & POL.591,
597 (1998) (claiming that the Shaw doctrine, if legislated, would have violated even the Equal
Protection Clause); Rubin, supranote 143, at 54 (discussing how states appear to be required to
use, and to be prohibited from using, race as they draw their electoral district lines).
"
See Raskin, supranote 147, at 597-601.
"
See Karlan,supranote 147, at 278-79; KOUSSER, supranote 147, at 377-78.
"9 See Karlan, supra note 147, at 279-81.
'3' Id. at 281-85.
"2
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equally open to participation"'' 2 by citizens on account of race or
color' in that they "have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice."'54 The amendments explicitly called for a
broad assessment, "based on the totality of circumstances' 5 as to
whether a denial of "fully effective voting strength" 6 has occurred.
The 1982 amendments thus pointed in the direction of a practical
and comprehensive study of whether jurisdictions covered by the
VRA (mostly southern states) were ensuring that racial minorities, especially African-Americans, were being given the same opportunity as
whites to participate and to elect the representatives they wanted.
The amendments were first implemented for congressional districting in 1991, as states such as North Carolina, Georgia, and Texas
found themselves with new seats as a result of the 1990 census. Under Section 5 of the VRA, the Department of Justice (DOJ) was responsible for enforcement. The DOJ was generally unsatisfied with
the congressional district plans proposed by these states because the
states had avoided drawing majority-black congressional districts
when they could have done so fairly easily.
In general, scholarly analyses of Shaw v. Reno and its progeny have
not sufficiently emphasized that all of the "racial gerrymandering"
cases concern states in the South. That is, all of the cases arise in a
region in which blacks have historically been excluded from the political process and denied the ability to select representatives of their
choice. 57 The politics of the contemporary South continue to be
saturated by racial distrust and its voting companion, racially polarized bloc voting. 8 This history undoubtedly influenced the DOJ to
encourage
states to draw additional majority-black congressional dis159
tricts.

The Supreme Court in the Shaw line of cases, however, ignored
the DOJ's rationale. Sometimes the Court would refer to the fact that
the DOJ had rejected various districting plans, but the Court never
identified the DOJ's rationale with any great clarity because the DOJ's
rationale destroyed the basis for the Court's intervention. As Peter
Rubin argues, "[t] he Court in Shaw and Millerrefused to examine the
factual situations in which North Carolina and Georgia decided to
draw race-conscious districts. If the Attorney General was correct in
his initial denial of preclearance in each case, North Carolina and
.. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
15 Id.
154 Id.
15 Id.

6 Rubin, supra note 143, at 79.
supranote 147.
'* See id
'" See Rubin, supra note 143, at 94-96 (discussing the Attorney General's reluctance to preclear reapportionment plans that did not recognize concentrations of minority voters).
157 See generallyKOUSSER,
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Georgia were both faced with racially polarized bloc voting, and the
additional black-majority congressional district in each case served to
combat vote dilution. "Certainly the complete absence of blacks from
either state's congressional delegation over a ninety-year period suggests that
the Attorney General's determination was not without sup160
port."

The VRA and its 1982 amendments afforded African-Americans a
right to vote for representatives of their choice. In the circumstances
of the South, this meant a right to be free, to the extent possible, of
racially polarized bloc voting by whites against black candidates. 6 '
The DOJ implemented this policy by mandating that states create additional majority-black congressional districts. By creating a cause of
action for racial gerrymandering, the Supreme Court put a stop to
this policy without examining the constitutional reasons it had been
adopted in the first place. The Court did avoid holding the 1982
VRA amendments to be unconstitutional. But, by nullifying their effect on congressional districting, the Court abrogated the rights of
African-Americans living in southern states. Given the South's sorry
history of racial discrimination, this was an unfortunate result.
The analysis does not stop here, however. The example of racial
redistricting is yet another instance in which the Supreme Court has
destroyed the rights of minorities. Once again, the Court has done
so without investigating the reasons, founded ultimately in democratic deliberation, as to why the policies it opposes were created in
the first place. Given the lack of such an investigation, there is no basis for saying that the Court has a superior title to reasoned deliberation in making constitutional decisions with respect to the meaning
of equal protection. I suggest the considered judgment of the political branches, reached first during the Reagan administration (in
which the 1982 amendments were passed) and enforced during the
Bush Administration (Bush I, that is) was superior when it comes to
the practical assessment of racial politics in the South and the appropriate remedy.
C. Enforcing the FourteenthAmendment
In City of Boerne, 62 the Supreme Court invalidated RFRA and
opened a new front in its contest with Congress over which branch
should set the boundaries of our constitutional rights. RFRA was an
unusual statute in that its manifest intent was to overturn Employment
Division v. Smith,ss something which can be accomplished normally
' Id. at 114.
.61
See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 49 (1986) (discussing how bloc voting can defeat

candidates supported by a politically cohesive, geographically insular minority group).
.'= City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
' s 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause permits the State to prohibit
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only through a constitutional amendment. Nevertheless, RFRA was
also an effort by Congress to better secure the First Amendment right
of free exercise of religion. In evaluating City of Boerne and subsequent cases construing Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, I
am again concerned with the issue of how the Court treats rights created by the political branches through democratic deliberation.
RFRA was enacted pursuant to the power of Congress, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to enforce the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses.' 6 Despite the "in your face" atmosphere surrounding the passage of RFRA, the Court could have seen
the statute as an effort by Congress to exercise its independent judgment about the nature of the free exercise right and the threat of invidious discrimination against religious beliefs. In City of Boerne, the
Court did acknowledge that Section 5 is a grant of additional legislative power to Congress'65 and that "[1]egislation which deters or
remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct
which is not itself unconstitutional.' ' 66 But the Court said this power
is still limited to enacting laws which enforce or remedy violations of
Fourteenth Amendment rights and does not extend to defining the
rights themselves. 67
To distinguish between laws that remedy violations of Section 1
and laws that create new rights, the Court proposed a test of "congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end."'ss RFRA could not
survive this test because it was a sweeping law that prohibited all levels
of government in the United States from substantially interfering
with the free exercise of religion unless officials could show a compelling interest."' To justify such a severe measure, Congress would have
had to show that all levels of government were in the habit of perse7
cuting the religious.Y
This Congress did not do. The Court simply
saw no justification for RFRA's blanket invocation of the compelling

sacramental peyote use and thus to deny unemployment benefits to persons discharged for
such use).
16 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see also City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 516-17.
16 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517 (following the Court's finding in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384
U.S. 461 (1966), that Section 5 was a positive grant of legislative power to Congress).
'dI. at 518.
,67
Id. at 519 (stating that Congress' enforcement power does not include determining what
Fourteenth Amendment rights are).
16 Id. at 520.
The Court concluded its discussion by citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803), and unwittingly begged the question: "IfCongress could define its own
powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, no longer would the Constitution be
,superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means.'" City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529.
Substituting "the Supreme Court" for "Congress" in this quotation poses the key issue that the
Court missed.
l69 Id. at 515-16.
'.Id. at 530.
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interest test given the lack of support in the legislative record and the
substantial burden it would impose on all levels of government. 7"
With Kimel v. FloridaBoard of Regents,17 2 United States v. Morrison,"'
and Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,'74 the Court
moved the City of Boerne doctrine into the area of equal protection.
In all three cases, the Court made it more difficult for citizens to obtain a remedy for discrimination suffered at the hands of state governments. Age discrimination was at issue in Kime, while Morrison
and Garrett concerned discrimination against women and the disabled, respectively.
In Kimel, the Court ruled that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) could not be applied to the states pursuant to
Congress' power to enforce Section 5. Applying the congruence and
proportionality test, the Court stated that "the substantive requirements the ADEA imposes on state and local governments are disproportionate to any unconstitutional conduct that conceivably could be
targeted by the Act."175 This was so because the Court had previously
held that classifications based on age were subject to rational basis review, not strict scrutiny.176 This meant that the stringent antidiscrimination provisions of the ADEA could not be justified, given
that they, in effect, presumed that age discrimination was always irrational. According to the Court, states can rationally make distinctions
among their employees on the basis of age. 77
Morrison concerned the constitutionality of the civil remedy
against gender motivated violence provided by the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA). The Court ruled that the remedy could not be
sustained either under the Commerce Clause or Section 5.178 With
respect to Section 5, the Court noted that the civil remedy was directed against individuals who commit crimes of violence, not against
states, thus failing the state action requirement.'79 However, there was
evidence in Morrison that state officials were discriminating against
women in the enforcement of the criminal law-not only a clear instance of state action, but one which violated the Court's precedents

"3

I&. at 532.

528 U.S. 62 (1999). See discussion infranotes 175-77, 194-96.
120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000). Seediscussion infranotes 178-81.
...
121 S. Ct. 955 (2001). See discussion infra notes 197-99.
3 Kim4 528 U.S. at 63.
'7 Id. at 63-65 (stating that age classifications are not subject to strict scrutiny because the
classification maybe related to rational government purpose and because older people are not
an insular minority that has suffered a history of unequal treatment).
" Id. at 83 (stating "[s]tates may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the
Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest").
"3 See Morrison, 120 S.Ct. at 1740.
"
See id at 1754-58 (discussing Congress' lack of power to enforce anti-discrimination laws
against private actors).
"
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giving heightened scrutiny to classifications based on gender.' 8 Here
the Court used the congruence and proportionality test from City of
Boerne to hold that, because VAWA's civil remedy was different from
remedies against state officials the Court had previously upheld, it
could not be constitutional."
Kimel appeared to be based on a doctrine that Congress could not
provide a remedy against state governments for forms of discrimination that the Court had refused to recognize. As Post and Siegel
summarize, "[i]f the exercise of congressional Section 5 power must
be congruent and proportional to behavior that a court would hold
unconstitutional under rational basis review, virtually all antidiscrimination legislation, except that protecting racial minorities and
women, will be rendered beyond Congress' Section 5 power. " 182 This

implication was realized fully in Garrett, in which the Supreme Court
employed City of Boerne and Kimel to immunize states from suits
brought under the ADA.
Unlike RFRA and the ADEA, Congress had amassed an extensive
and thorough legislative record justifying the provisions of the
ADA. l"" It proved unavailing. After demonstrating that discrimination against the disabled was subject only to rational basis review,'8
the Court in Garrett found the legislative record insufficient. "5 Although Congress had documented the pervasiveness of discrimination against the disabled in American society, it could not be assumed
that a similar pattern existed with respect to the states.1" Even if
there was such a pattern, the Court stated that the congruence and
proportionality test would counsel against the constitutionality of any
remedy against the states. This was because the ADA required state
employers to provide "reasonable accommodation"8 7 to the disabled.
This was far out of proportion to what the Court has ruled the Constitution requires in terms of redressing discrimination.' 8 Subjecting
the states to suits for damages was therefore an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' Section 5 powers. 8 9
City of Boernds congruence and proportionality test has functioned
as a strict standard of review of Congress' Section 5 powers.'" As Post

.. See id. at 1758 (stating that there was "gender-based disparate treatment by state authorities" in Morrison).
"' See id. at 1758-59 (stating that VAWA is not aimed at action made unconstitutional by the
Fourteenth Amendment because it is aimed at individuals who have committed criminal acts).
1"2Post & Siegel, supra note 49, at 461.
See Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 969-72, 976-93 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
See id. at 963-64.
See id.
at 964-68.
. See id at 965-66.
'n See id.
at 967.
"* See id
See id.
at 967-68.
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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and Siegel argue, this "suspicion and hostility" 9' toward the exercise
of one of Congress' enumerated powers exists nowhere else in constitutional law. Notably, there is no parallel to the means-end scrutiny
involved in the congruence and proportionality test with respect to
the Commerce Clause. In carrying out this form of strict scrutiny in
Kimel and Garrett,the Court had to make some very questionable assertions concerning the evidence that Congress amassed. In City of
Boerne such assertions were largely unnecessary, given the sweep of
the statute and the generally inadequate job Congress did building a
legislative record. It would have been better, however, if both Congress and the Court could have found a way to more directly address
what appeared to be the real nature of the problem-not "religious
bigotry"9 as the Court thought, but the systematic undervaluing of
constitutional norms concerning
193 religion by officials in the adminilaws.
stration of state and local

In Kinwl the Court applied the congruence and proportionality
test by finding that "the substantive requirements the ADEA imposes
on state and local governments are disproportionate to any unconsti94
tutional conduct that conceivably could be targeted by the Act."

The Court was unable to back this essentially legislative assertion with
any substantial evidence because it had faced the problem of age discrimination in only three cases. The Court stated that the aged "have
not been subjected to a 'history of purposeful unequal treatment,"' 9"
but again did not cite any evidence. The Court did examine the legislative record of the ADEA but here it arguably went beyond even
strict scrutiny in questioning
196 the evidentiary basis of arguments made
by members of Congress. In reaching their conclusion that extending the ADEA to the states was justified, members of Congress were,
as a constitutional matter, entitled to rely on any evidence at all, including their own personal experience. The Supreme Court's criticism raises separation of powers concerns in that it implies that the
Court will be requiring in the future that Congress justify statutes in
particular ways. This is a judicial encroachment on a purely legislative function.
With respect to the ADA, I reviewed in Part I the essential findings
that Congress made tojustify its passage. These findings fully support
application of the ADA to the states, as Congress found discrimination against the disabled in the provision of public services, including
Post & Siegel, supra note 49, at 477.
City of Boerne 521 U.S. at 530.
'"See Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boeme v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV.
743, 773-74 (1998) (stating that there is a reasonable inference that there is a high percentage
of government administrators that hold a hostile view towards religious fundamentalists). See
also GARRErr EPPs, To AN UNKNOWN GOD: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL (2001).
' Kimel 528 U.S. at 83.
"

15 Id.

"" See id. at 89-92.
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voting rights. Despite this, the Court in Garrettfound that " [t]he legislative record of the ADA... simply fails to show that Congress did
in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the disabled."'9 7 Here the Court seems to be reiterating
its point that the disabled are not a suspect class. To the extent that
the Court was contesting the evidence Congress produced, however,
this argument is implausible. The Court appears to want Congress to
come up with evidence of state discrimination against the disabled
that matches the depth of evidence with respect to society generally.
Congress did produce evidence of state discrimination. But the more
important point is that the evidence of societal discrimination against
the disabled of course apjlies to the states since their employees are
part of American society.
In City of Boerne, Kimel, Morrison, and Garrett, the Supreme Court
destroyed rights that the political branches thought were important
to the enforcement of constitutional values. Without the doctrine of
heightened scrutiny, the outcome in Kimel and Garrettwould have
been different. The Court would not have engaged in an inquiry as
to whether the elderly and the disabled deserve a higher degree of
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. But City of Boerne and
Morrisonshow that the abolition of heightened scrutiny is not enough
to get the Court out of the business of destroying valuable constitutional rights. What is required is the adoption of a deferential standard of review toward the exercise of Congress' power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment9
CONCLUSION
Heightened scrutiny of legislative classifications based on race and
other forms of invidious discrimination has been justified on the
ground that it is important to preserve the rights of minority groups
against incursions by the majority. This rationale is not responsive to
a situation in which the Supreme Court uses heightened scrutiny to
destroy valuable civil rights created by the political branches through
democratic deliberation. In this circumstance, what is to be feared is
a Court employing judicial standards that are inappropriate to evaluating rights designed to promote constitutional values. To prevent
the Court from destroying essential civil rights, the doctrine of
heightened scrutiny should be abolished and a uniform "rational basis" test should be employed to evaluate statutes enacted to prevent
unjust discrimination. In addition, when Congress uses its powers
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the Equal

'97

Garrett, 121 S.Ct. at 965.

See id. at 970 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
' See id. at 974-76 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
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Protection Clause, the Court should employ a deferential standard of
review.
I am well aware that some would regard the abolition of heightened scrutiny as a sign that the constitutional system no longer regards racial discrimination as unjust. Strict scrutiny for racial classifications has been the legal system's way of saying that racism is morally
unacceptable. Of course, my call for the abolition of heightened
scrutiny is based on the idea that the political branches are doing a
better job than the Court in combating racial discrimination, and
thus I am not advocating or implying in any way that racial discrimination is morally acceptable. I understand that some may wish that a
judicial backstop to the political process exist in case the political
branches somehow lose sight of the moral unacceptability of racism.
What I would point out is that in the politicized atmosphere that
characterizes a democracy of rights, there is no such thing as a true
safe haven for any set of political values. The issue of racism or any
other matter that poses fundamental questions of justice and rights
must be fought out in the real world amid real institutions on a day to
day basis. This is the ultimate legacy of the civil rights movementnot a set of fundamental principles based in a theory ofjustice, but a
set of democratized arenas ready to decide politically concrete issues
of rights.

